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ABSTRACT: Argumentative discussion is successful only if, at the concluding stage, both parties can 
agree about the result of their enterprise. If they can not, the whole discussion threatens to start all over 
again. Dialectical ruling should prevent this from happening. The paper investigates whether dialectical 
rules may enforce a decision one way or the other; either by recognizing some arguments as conclusive 
or some criticisms as devastating. At the end the pragma-dialectical model appears more successful 
than even its protagonists have claimed. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
According to common wisdom, it is easier to get into an argument than to get out of it. 
And it is not even that easy to get an argument started; certainly not when one wants 
the argument to proceed along sound lines, as stipulated by the pragma-dialectical 
model of critical discussion (Van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1984, 1992, 2004). As 
is commonly known, this model consists of four stages: the confrontation stage, the 
opening stage, the argumentation stage, and the concluding stage. In an earlier paper 
(Krabbe, 2006) I discussed some of the problems that beset the opening stage and 
make it hard to rationally start an argument. This time I want to concentrate on the 
concluding stage and the problems that threaten to frustrate the proper ending of an 
argumentative discussion. 
The concluding stage is the one ‘in which the parties establish what the result 
is of an attempt to resolve a difference of opinion’ (Van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 
2004, p. 61). Supposing the discussion to have been centered upon one initial 
standpoint (thesis), defended by a protagonist and challenged by an antagonist, the 
questions that need to be answered in this final stage of discussion are the following: 
Given what happened in the confrontation stage, the opening stage, and the 
argumentation stage, is the protagonist now obliged to retract his initial standpoint? Is 
the antagonist obliged to retract her calling into question of the initial standpoint? Or 
is neither party obliged to retract its original position? If the first question can be 
answered in the affirmative, the difference of opinion has been resolved in favor of 
the antagonist; if the second, in favor of the protagonist; otherwise, no resolution has 
been achieved. 
Section 2 will describe some predicaments connected with the concept of a 
concluding stage of argumentative discussion. Section 3 will investigate whether the 
idea of a conclusive argument or a devastating criticism can help us to make the 
concept more definite. A first impression is, that this will not be the case. Section 4 
and 5 continue the investigation of conclusiveness in a pragma-dialectical direction, 
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taking it to be a notion that is relative to the discussion at hand. In Section 6 we shall 
see that, ultimately, there is little about conclusiveness that is conclusive, but that 
nevertheless, within the model of critical discussion, but contrary to the modesty of 
the pragma-dialectician’s claims, a concluding stage will always result in the 
resolution of the initial difference of opinion.1
 
2. SOME PREDICAMENTS 
 
There is a problem about getting to the concluding stage, a problem about what to do 
once being in the concluding stage, and also a problem of getting out of the 
concluding stage. 
To start with getting to the concluding stage: if there is a predicament here, 
this can not literally be a predicament of the concluding stage, but should rather be 
characterized as a predicament of the argumentation stage, because it is from the 
argumentation stage that one must enter the concluding stage. When should this 
transition take place? When neither of the discussants has anything left to say? But 
that could take an indefinite time. Perhaps someone should, after a reasonable period, 
propose that the discussion be concluded. But who of the discussants can rightfully 
claim to be in the position to take the initiative and to say: ‘Now we have had enough 
arguments and comments, let’s conclude this session.’? And can such an 
announcement be proclaimed, without any constraints, at any moment of the 
development of the argumentation stage? 
In our salad days, when my brother and I had many arguments, there were no 
constraints. The concluding stage was announced by a forceful statement of one’s 
opinion and completed by a loud utterance of ‘Bang!’. Whoever first remembered that 
this was the way to end any heated dispute between us, could avail himself of this 
practical method. For winning the day, just state your final opinion on the issue, 
followed by ‘Bang!’. Later on, we felt this was too easy and one had to utter a more 
complicated formula: not just ‘Bang!’, but ‘Bang! Stop it! Period!’, exactly in that 
order. This, of course, was much harder to remember in a heated dispute. I think it 
was my brother who at a certain occasion, after I had performed this little ceremony, 
and thought my proposition to be safe, continued the argument saying ‘Yes, but we 
must change this a bit’. This, of course, was intolerable. So, in the end, the formula 
was extended to “read: ‘Bang! Stop it! Period! No alterations!’ it worked fine. For one 
thing, this rule did not spoil our arguments, for in the heat of discussion it usually 
lasted quite some time before anyone remembered about the way we had decided 
disputes could be ended. 
Yet, one feels that in critical discussion one should observe some more 
sophisticated protocol for entering the concluding stage. The task for the theoretician, 
then, is to find a set of dialectic rules that prevent indefinite and senseless dilation of 
the argumentation stage, without giving either discussant the power to curb the other’s 
fundamental rights to bring forward arguments or criticisms. 
Second, once the discussants have entered the concluding the concluding stage 
they are confronted with the problem of what to do next. The predicament here is that, 
in order to establish the yield of their discussion, they must either take the results of 
the argumentation stage for granted or make an assessment of the results of the 
argumentation stage. In the first case, the whole concluding stage would be nugatory, 
                                                          
1 Another version of this paper, containing a number of additional notes, will be published in Cédric 
Dégremont, Laurent Keiff, and Helge Rückert (Eds.), Essays in Honour of  Shahid Rahman, College 
Publications, 2007. I wish to thank the anonymous referee of this version, as well as David Godden, 
who was my OSSA-commentator, for their helpful suggestions. 
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since everything has been established in the argumentation stage, whereas in the 
second case the attempt to assess the results of the argumentation will involve the use 
of arguments and hence catapult the discussants back into the same or another 
argumentation stage. 
That it is often not acceptable that people at the concluding stage revert to 
earlier stages is nicely illustrated by the case of Mrs. Hans, the notorious antagonist 
figuring in one of the exercises of a pragma-dialectical textbook (Van Eemeren et al., 
2002, pp. 33-36). The exercise presents the case of a discussion at Harrods’s 
department store about whether or not to join a program that would make ex-prisoners 
available as employees. Mrs. Hans is adamantly opposed to this idea: ‘Well , in my 
view it is sheer madness to employ a bunch of prisoners, and that twenty per cent of 
my staff members are to be replaced by criminals.’ But after some argument from the 
other side, she seems to be entering the concluding stage when she admits: ‘Well, if 
that’s the case, then I can’t really say anything more against it.’ However, she 
immediately returns to the confrontation stage, adding: ‘But I still can’t agree to it’. 
As the discussion moves towards a positive decision on this issue, she sticks to this 
attitude of reverting to the confrontation stage, yelling ‘No criminals in my 
department!’ and claiming to have insurmountable (but unexplained) objections.  
Even if such extremes as those exemplified by Mrs. Hans can be avoided, it is 
easy to imagine that each concluding stage in which the upshot of an argumentation 
stage has to be summarized and evaluated, will amply occasion fresh differences of 
opinion, or revive old ones, leading to more confrontation stages, opening stages, and 
argumentation stages, that must be ended by concluding stages in which the problem 
recurs. This yields a third predicament, that of how to conclude the concluding stage. 
 
3. CONCLUSIVE ARGUMENTS AND DEVASTATING CRITICISMS 
 
The predicaments of the concluding stage would not be so threatening if only we had 
definite, decidable and practicable concepts of what constitutes a conclusive argument 
for a thesis and of what constitutes a devastating criticism of a thesis. A devastating 
criticism of a thesis could of course consist of a conclusive argument for the opposite 
thesis, but it may also amount to a conclusive argument that no conclusive argument 
for the thesis exists. 
Once in possession of such concepts and related decision procedures, 
discussants could agree to use the following procedure for their concluding stage 
(assuming there to be just one initial thesis): (1) During the argumentation stage, each 
discussant may open a concluding stage, but will have to pay a fine if the concluding 
stage does not lead to a resolution of the difference of opinion. This fine is needed to 
prevent the discussants from needlessly interrupting the process of argumentation. (2) 
In the concluding stage the discussants establish the result of their discussion by first 
making an inventory of all arguments for the thesis that were, during the 
argumentation stage, presented by the protagonist. They then apply their decision 
procedure for conclusiveness to each argument. As soon as it has been found that one 
of the arguments was conclusive, they declare the protagonist to have won the 
discussion. (3) They also make an inventory of every criticism of the thesis that was, 
during the argumentation stage, put forward by the antagonist. They then apply their 
decision procedure for conclusiveness to each criticism. As soon as it has been found 
that one of the criticisms was conclusive, and therefore devastating, they declare the 
antagonist to have won the discussion. (4) If it turns out that, during the 
argumentation stage, neither a conclusive argument for the thesis nor a devastating 
criticism of thesis was put forward, the discussion will be declared a draw. 
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There is one serious drawback to this procedure; that is that, according to 
Ralph Johnson at least, conclusive arguments do not exist (Johnson, 2000, pp. 228-
236). According to Johnson, in order ‘to be conclusive, an argument would have to 
display four properties’ (p. 232): 
 
(C1) Its premises would have to be unimpeachable or uncriticizable. (p. 233.) 
(C2) The connection between premises and the conclusion would have to be 
unimpeachable−the strongest possible. (p. 233.) 
(C3) A conclusive argument is one that can successfully (and rationally) 
resist every attempt at legitimate criticism. (p. 233.) 
(C4) The argument would be regarded as a conclusive argument. (p. 234; 
stress added) 
 
Johnson argues that no argument ‘has satisfied all these conditions’ (p. 234). 
But are not mathematical proofs the paradigm examples of conclusive 
arguments? Johnson holds that ‘though mathematical proofs are conclusive, they are 
not arguments and so are not conclusive arguments’(p. 232). But here, to see whether 
proofs are arguments, we must distinguish between formal and informal proofs 
(Krabbe, 1997). Formal proofs, being purely formal objects or syntactic structures, are 
indeed not by themselves arguments, though they can be used to express arguments, 
but then these arguments they express (through some process of interpretation) are 
themselves at most informal proofs. Informal proofs I hold to be arguments, but then, 
I must admit, these proofs are seldom if ever conclusive (cf. Lakatos, 1976). Even the 
(informal) proof showing that there is no greatest prime number, may be less 
conclusive than Johnson seems to assume (2000, p. 232), since one could question the 
underlying logic or deny the possibility of multiplying arbitrarily big numbers. For 
Johnson, Euclid’s proof is conclusive but not an argument, whereas I would hold that 
it is an argument, and a very strong one, but not in all respects conclusive. A 
formalization of Euclid’s proof may be called conclusive for the system in which it is 
formalized, but would not be an argument. Neither Johnson nor I have found a 
conclusive argument in this case. 
Again, are there any conclusive arguments? Of course, Johnson will not hold 
his argument that there are no conclusive arguments to be a conclusive argument. 
Neither do I. Nevertheless, Johnson’s analysis of what it would mean for an argument 
to be conclusive convincingly shows that conclusive arguments will be extremely rare 
in argumentative practice and that, consequently, the notion of conclusiveness is 
otiose; it can certainly not serve as a foundation for the regimentation of the 
concluding stage. As long as conclusiveness remains a necessary condition for either 
the protagonist or the antagonist to be declared winner of the discussion (as is the case 
in the procedures mentioned above), hardly any interesting discussion will ever be 
won or lost. This means that discussions will generally fail to resolve differences of 
opinion. 
 
4. CONCLUSIVE DEFENSE 
 
Given that the notion of conclusiveness does not work, it may seem surprising that the 
notions of conclusive defense and conclusive attack nevertheless function prominently 
in the pragma-dialectic model of critical discussion (Van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 
2004, Ch. 6, esp. Rule 9 and Rule 14). But here those notions are not used in the 
absolute sense of defenses or attacks that would settle matters to all eternity, but in a 
sense relative to a particular discussion with particular discussion rules, adopted 
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procedures, and agreed common starting points. The claim is that relative to all these 
matters (to be settled in the opening stage) defenses and attacks can be conclusive. 
What constitutes a conclusive defense is given by Rule 9a: 
 
The protagonist has conclusively defended an initial standpoint or sub-
standpoint by means of a complex speech act of argumentation if he has 
successfully defended both the propositional content called into question by 
the antagonist and its force of justification or refutation called into question 
by the antagonist. (Van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 2004, p. 151.) 
 
This rule should be understood bearing the following things in mind. Before the start 
of the argumentation stage, the initial standpoint has been challenged (called into 
question) by the antagonist. It is now up to the protagonist to defend his initial 
standpoint by means of a complex speech act of argumentation, which counts as a 
provisional defense of the standpoint (Rule 6a, p. 144). There are two ways for the 
antagonist to react: she may call into question either the ‘propositional content’ of the 
argumentation (here to be called: its premises) or (in the case of a positive standpoint) 
its justificatory force (here to be called: its link).2 Both links and premises will be 
called inputs of the arguments in which they figure. Rule 9a is obviously not intended 
to declare argumentative defenses conclusive when the antagonist has not yet had the 
opportunity to call into question certain inputs. Rather it presupposes that the 
antagonist had her say, that is, that she had the opportunity to call into question each 
and every input she wishes (in the spirit of Rule 10, p. 152). The gist of Rule 9a (in 
the case of a positive standpoint) can now be formulated as follows: If and only if 
every input of a protagonist’s argument that was called into question by the antagonist 
(where the antagonist had every opportunity to do so) has been successfully defended 
by the protagonist, has the protagonist conclusively defended his positive standpoint 
by means of the argument. 
To understand what it means to conclusively defend a standpoint, we are thus 
referred to the notion of a successful defense of the inputs of arguments. For this we 
must turn to Rules 7a (p. 147) and 8a (p. 150). These rules refer to certain procedures, 
or tests, that the discussants are supposed to have agreed upon in the opening stage. 
The intersubjective identification procedure can be applied to premises and will check 
whether a premise is identical to one of the propositions that was, at the opening 
stage, accepted by both discussants (pp. 145-147).3 The intersubjective inference 
procedure can be applied to links (in cases where the reasoning has been completely 
expressed) and tests for deductive validity (p. 148). The intersubjective testing 
procedure can also be applied to links, and checks whether the argumentation scheme 
that was employed is admissible (according to agreements at the opening stage) and 
whether it was applied correctly (pp. 149-150).4 When an input has been tested by 
some procedure that applies to it, and with positive result, it will be called a fixed 
input. Rule 7a and 8a stipulate that when an input has become fixed it counts as 
having been successfully defended by the protagonist. For links, this is the whole 
                                                          
2 This, of course, corresponds to Arne Næss’s dichotomy of tenability and relevance (Næss, 1966, p. 
108ff; cf. Krabbe, 1987). I shall not discuss negative standpoints. 
3 This procedure is supposed to have been extended (through agreements in the opening stage) by 
methods that allow for the introduction of fresh information, such as procedures for consulting 
authoritative sources or for observing the phenomenal world (pp. 146-147). Barth and Krabbe (1982, p. 
104) mention also computation as one kind of what they call ‘material procedures’. 
4 For simplicity, I do not describe the role of the intersubjective explicitization procedure as a separate 
component (p. 148-149). 
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story, they can only be successfully defended by becoming fixed; that is, by passing 
either of the two tests for links. But for premises Rule 7a opens up another way: a 
premise will also count as having been successfully defended if it has been ‘accepted 
by both parties as a result of a sub-discussion in which the protagonist has 
successfully defended a positive sub-standpoint with regard to this propositional 
content’ (p. 147). This means that the argument may become complex, for premises 
may be defended by further arguments with links and premises, and these premises 
again by further argument, and so on. An argument that is not complex will be called 
elementary. 
If we want to use Rule 7a as a definition of ‘successfully defended’, there is a 
slight difficulty with it in as far as a notion of successful defense occurs also in the 
definiens. Not that the definition is circular. It is not circular because in the definiens 
‘successfully defended’ is applied to standpoints, whereas the definiendum is applied 
to premises. The problem is that we are not told what it means for a standpoint to have 
been successfully defended. Nevertheless, it seems clear that a standpoint has been 
defended successfully if and only if the protagonist won the critical discussion in 
which it was defended, that is to say if and only if the antagonist was obliged to 
retract the calling into question of the standpoint, something that can be the case if 
and only if the standpoint was defended conclusively (Rule 14, p. 154). Thus, for 
‘successfully defended’ in the definiens, we may read ‘conclusively defended’. If this 
is correct, Rule 7a, in its turn, refers to Rule 9a. Yet, again there is no circularity. 
Rather Rules 7a, 8a, and 9a together constitute a recursive definition in which the two 
notions, ‘conclusively defended’ and ‘successfully defended’ are simultaneously 
defined. This definition can, with respect to a possibly complex argument, be 
formulated as follows: 
 
(1) (basic clause) Any input5 that has been fixed counts as having been 
successfully defended (Rules 7a and 8a). 
(2) (first inductive clause) Any positive standpoint6 defended by an elementary 
argument all of whose inputs were either not called into question (the 
antagonist having had every opportunity to do so) or successfully defended 
counts as having been conclusively defended (Rule 9a). 
(3) (second inductive clause) Any premise7 that is the propositional content of a 
positive standpoint that has been conclusively defended counts as successfully 
defended (Rule 7a). 
(4) (extremal clause) No positive standpoint shall count as conclusively defended 
and no input shall count as successfully defended, unless this follows from 
clauses (1) through (3). 
 
The theory can be somewhat simplified if we permit (against Rule 6c, p. 144) a 
limiting case of critical discussion, where the initial (positive) standpoint is not 
defended by argument but by an application of the intersubjective identification 
procedure. That means that the propositional content of the initial standpoint (which 
content will henceforth be called the conclusion) might be fixed, and thus might be 
successfully defended. It is harmless to count the conclusion as successfully defended 
also whenever the initial standpoint has been conclusively defended by argument. Let 
                                                          
5 That is, any input (premise or link) of any of the elementary arguments out of which the (possibly) 
complex argument consists.  
6 That is, the initial standpoint or any sub-standpoint. 
7 That is, any premise of any of the elementary arguments out of which the (possibly) complex 
argument consists. 
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us call each input and also the conclusion an element of the possibly complex 
argument. In what follows, a defense of an element (not a link) is to be understood as 
a defense of a positive standpoint with regard to that element. It is now possible to 
unravel the duplex definition given above by first giving a separate recursive 
definition for ‘successfully defended’:  
 
a) (basic clause) Any element that has been fixed counts as having been 
successfully defended. 
b) (inductive clause) Any element defended by an elementary argument all of 
whose inputs were either not called into question (the antagonist having 
had every opportunity to do so) or successfully defended counts as having 
been successfully defended. 
c) (extremal clause) No element shall count as successfully defended, unless 
this follows from clauses (a) and (b). 
 
In a second step, it may be stipulated that a positive standpoint counts as having been 
conclusively defended if and only if its propositional content counts as having been 
successfully defended. 
The present notion of conclusive defense is very different from Johnson’s 
notion of conclusive argument. None of the necessary conditions discussed by 
Johnson (2000, p. 232-234), which he plausibly argued never to have been satisfied, 
applies to the present notion. The premises and the connection between premises and 
conclusion need not be unimpeachable, rather they must have been either fixed by 
agreed procedures or settled by further discussion. A conclusive argumentative 
defense in the present sense need not be immune for legitimate criticism; it is only the 
present antagonist who sees no further ways of calling inputs of the argument into 
question. Nor need a conclusive argumentative defense in the present sense be 
generally regarded as a conclusive argument in Johnson’s sense; for its conclusiveness 
will remain restricted to a specific dialectical situation. The present notion is of course 
theoretical and idealized, but one can imagine something like it to be exemplified in 
argumentative practice. Perhaps this notion can support a feasible concluding stage. 
 
5. CONCLUSIVE ATTACK 
 
For the most simple type of critical discussion, with only one initial standpoint, one 
protagonist, and one antagonist, the achievement closest to that of producing a 
devastating criticism would be that of carrying out a conclusive attack. This notion is 
defined in Rule 9b:  
 
The antagonist has conclusively attacked the [complex speech act of 
argumentation8] of the protagonist if he has successfully attacked either the 
propositional content or the force of justification or refutation of the complex 
speech act of argumentation. (Van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 2004, p. 151.) 
 
The gist of Rule 9b (in the case of a positive standpoint) can be formulated as follows: 
If and only if at least one input of a protagonist’s argument has been successfully 
attacked by the antagonist, has the antagonist conclusively attacked the argument 
presented by the protagonist. To see what it means to successfully attack some input 
                                                          
8 The phrase ‘complex speech act of argumentation’ here replaces the original ‘standpoint’, which 
seems inappropriate.  
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we must turn to Rules 7b (p. 147) and 8b (p. 150). There we learn that, in order to 
count as successfully attacked, an input should upon attack (calling into question) by 
the antagonist have failed all tests that were applied to it9 and, moreover, not have 
been successfully defended by the protagonist in a sub-discussion. Moreover, it seems 
reasonable to stipulate that the protagonist must have had his say, that is, that he must 
have had every opportunity to apply tests and to put forward an argumentative 
defense. But also the antagonist must have had her say about the arguments put 
forward by the protagonist to defend the attacked input. Otherwise, this input might 
not have been successfully defended by an argument merely because the antagonist 
lacked the opportunity to challenge some element (see clause (b) in the definition of 
‘successfully defended’). In this case it would be premature to say that the attacked 
input has been attacked conclusively (even if it has failed its tests). 
As in the preceding section, when discussing successful defense, we may 
expand also the notion of successful attack so as to apply not only to inputs but also to 
the conclusion. Further, we may count a (positive) standpoint as conclusively attacked 
if and only if its propositional content was successfully attacked (which implies that 
each complex speech act of argumentation put forward as a defense of the standpoint 
was conclusively attacked in the sense of Rule 9b). 
Now it may be shown that, assuming that both parties had their say, that is, 
that they had every opportunity to put forward their defenses and attacks (including 
applications of tests), each contested (attacked) element of an argument counts as 
successfully attacked if and only if it does not count as successfully defended. For, 
given this assumption, a contested element counts as successfully attacked if and only 
if (1) it failed all its tests, and (2) no argument for it was presented in which all the 
contested inputs were successfully defended (which is what successful defense in a 
sub-discussion amounts to). The conjunction of (1) an (2) is again equivalent to the 
element’s not counting as successfully defended. 
The upshot of this exercise is that, as long as it is assumed that both parties 
had their say, successful attack is not an independent notion but, in the domain of 
contested elements, just the complement of successful defense. Consequently, the 
conclusion, being contested, will either count as successfully defended or as 
successfully attacked and the (positive) initial standpoint will either count as 
conclusively defended or as conclusively attacked. Does this mean that, once the 
discussants enter the concluding stage, the resolution of their difference of opinion is 
guaranteed?  
 
6. THE INCONCLUSIVENESS OF CONCLUSIVENESS 
 
One of the predicaments of the concluding stage was whether to take the results of the 
argumentation stage for granted, or first to assess them, with the risk of starting the 
argument all over again. The pragma-dialecticians take the first option: in critical 
discussion the concluding stage is a rather modest affair. On the basis of what 
happened in the earlier stages, either the protagonist must retract his initial standpoint, 
or the antagonist must retract her calling into question of the initial standpoint, or no 
retractions need to be performed. According to Rule 14, the first speech act is 
obligatory if and only if the argumentation stage yielded a conclusive attack on the 
initial standpoint, whereas the second speech act is obligatory if and only if the 
argumentation stage yielded a conclusive defense of the initial standpoint (Van 
Eemeren and Grootendorst, 2004, p. 154). 
                                                          
9 In Rule 8b line 3 I read ‘and’ instead of ‘or’. The rules presuppose that the tests were applied. 
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 Only if one of these retractions is performed, does the critical discussion 
succeed in achieving a resolution of the difference of opinion. From the preceding 
section it is obvious that this will always be the case when each discussant did have 
his or her say, that is, if the protagonist had every opportunity to advance arguments 
and to apply procedures, and the antagonist had every opportunity to call elements 
into question. 
 The problem then is how to determine when each discussant has had his or her 
say. An argument may seem conclusive, but then the antagonist may come up with 
new doubt and call into question an element that was previously thought to be 
uncontested. Similarly, a seemingly conclusive attack may be undercut when the 
protagonist suddenly sees a new possibility for argumentative defense. Thus there is 
not much conclusiveness about attacks and defenses being or not being conclusive as 
long as some party can still add some contribution. Since the protagonist can always 
try a new argumentative defense there is no such thing as an absolutely conclusive 
attack, the conclusiveness of an attack always depends on the protagonist’s having 
had his say. On the other hand, there can be an absolutely conclusive defense, namely 
one in which all the links and all the basic premises (premises that are not 
argumentatively defended) are fixed. For in that case new attacks can nowhere be 
aimed. But even in that case the conclusiveness need not be everlasting, since the 
protagonist could still retract some part of the argument (Rule 12, p. 153). 
 Perhaps the only way, in critical discussion, to determine the moment for both 
discussants to admit to have had their say and to enter the concluding stage is to let 
the discussants themselves make the decision. The protocol, which may be started at 
any moment during the argumentation stage would run as follows: 
 
X: Let us go to the concluding stage!  
Y: OK. (If Y refuses X will have to pay a small fine.) 
 
In the concluding stage it is then simply assumed that each discussant has had his or 
her say.  
Moreover, it may be stipulated that the discussants move to the concluding 
stage, and are supposed to have had their say, as soon as in two consecutive turns both 
discussants pass. 
The effect of these rulings is that (contrary to what is suggested by Rule 14c, 
p. 154) whenever there is a concluding stage the difference of opinion will always be 
resolved. This does not mean that critical discussion will always be successful in 
resolving the difference of opinion, for there is no guarantee that a concluding stage 
will ever be reached. Moreover, the resolution of a difference of opinion is not itself 
conclusive, since a discussion may be reopened: ‘an argumentative dispute can in 
principle never be settled once and for all’ (p. 138). 
To sum up, the pragma-dialectical notion of conclusiveness supports a 
feasible, but modest, concluding stage, but will, happily, not prevent discussions from 
being reopened and certainly not put issues beyond debate. 
 
link to commentary
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